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regard entirely the fact that before his retirement the partnership
relation had imposed upon appellant a primary obligation.18
This supposed equitable consideration was enough to convince the court
to call into play the peculiar status of a compensated surety which itself
was a product of equitable considerations. The court did not mention that
even though the status of a compensated suretyship relation reduces the
otherwise severe impact that would be imposed upon the creditor's rights
if a gratuitous suretyship were involved, the fact nevertheless remains that
the creditor's rights have been unilaterally diminished.
The UPA has codified the principles of release without consideration's
and gratuitous suretyship by operation of law.2° It is submitted that both
principles are undesirable in legal theory and in practical effect. It is un-
fortunate that the court in this case adopted the former principle and modi-
fied the latter, not only because of the inherent inequity in the doctrine,
but also because there existed no compelling statutory or case precedent21
in the jurisdiction.
EDWARD B. GINN
Sales—Unfair Competition—Equitable Servitudes on Chattels.—Inde-
pendent News Co. v. Williams.1—Plaintiff, Independent News Co. (Inde-
pendent), is a large scale distributor of comics; plaintiff, National Comics
Publications Inc., is a publisher of comic books under some forty-five dif-
ferent titles; plaintiff, Superman, Inc., owns the copyright and trademarks
covering the various titles and characters appearing in the comic books.
They brought an action for a preliminary injunction against a secondhand
periodical dealer (Williams) to prevent his selling cover-removed2 comics
purchased by him from waste paper dealers. Williams purchased them from
certain wholesalers who were contractually bound to plaintiff, Independent,
to sell the cover-removed comics as waste paper only. The contracts between
18 White v. Brown, supra note I, at 728.
19 See TJPA 11 36(2) cited in note 6 supra.
20 UPA 36(3):
Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partner-
ship, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from
any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement,
consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obli-
gations.
21 White v. Brown, supra note 1.
1 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961).
2 It must be emphasized that there is a vital difference between a cover-removed
periodical and a secondhand periodical. A secondhand periodical is one which
has been placed on the market and sold. It subsequently, through one channel
or another, finds its way into the hands of a secondhand magazine dealer who
may have collected it himself from a reader or acquired it by purchase from
some other collector. A cover-removed periodical represents one which has had
its cover removed by a Wholesaler who had returned such cover to the Distribu-
tor for full credit. The remains of such a periodical represents the subject matter
of this lawsuit.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-4.
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Independent and the wholesalers regulated a distribution system which was
operated uniformly throughout the country. Independent sells the comics to
a wholesaler, who resells them to retail outlets; the retailers agree to sell
them for a specified period and then to return unsold copies for full credit
to the wholesaler. In turn, the wholesaler, upon fulfilling certain specified ob-
ligations, i.e., removing and returning the covers to Independent, mutilating
the comics so that they are fit only for use as waste paper, and disposing of
them as waste paper, is entitled to full credit from Independent.3 In accord
with this policy Independent inscribes in each magazine the legend:
This periodical may not be sold except by authorized dealers and
is sold subject to the conditions that it shall not be sold or distrib-
uted with any part of its cover or markings removed, nor in a muti-
lated condition, nor affixed to, nor as part of any advertising,
literary or pictorial matter whatsoever.4
The District Court denied injunctive relief.5 The Court of Appeals affirmed.
HELD: There was no evidence that the waste paper dealers from whom de-
fendant purchased the comics had any contractual obligation to use the
comics as waste paper only, nor that the waste paper dealer had any notice
of any restriction whatsoever on the cover-removed comics, nor that de-
fendant had any knowledge that any of the waste paper dealers from whom
he purchased was obligated to sell the coverless comics as waste paper
only. Thus, when the waste paper dealer purchased the comics from the
wholesaler he obtained the totality of property rights in the comics which
included the right to sell them to defendant for sale as reading material.°
Furthermore, there was no violation by defendant of the federal trademark7
3 The contract between Independent and the wholesalers provides, inter &la, as
follows:
Except as hereinafter provided, returns shall consist of top parts of front
covers showing dates of issues, but before Wholesaler shall become entitled to
credit for returns of unsold copies, Wholesaler must recover such copies whole,
and after detaching front covers thereof shall destroy or mutilate the remaining
portions thereof so as to render them unsalable as publications. Wholesaler agrees
that such destroyed or mutilated portions of return copies shall be disposed of
or sold for no other purpose than waste paper, and that he will obtain a written
commitment from the purchasers of such destroyed or mutilated return copies
that the same will be used only for waste and will not be resold.
Supra note 1, at 512.
4 Id. at 517.
5 Independent News Co. v. Williams, 184 F. Supp. 877 (ED. Pa. 1960).
6 UCC 2-403(2). There is some question as to exactly what issues were considered
and determined by the decision. Plaintiff, in its brief, argued alternatively for a prospec-
tive injunction to prevent defendant from future acquisitions and sales of plaintiff's
cover-removed magazines, if it were determined that an injunction as to the magazines
now in defendant's possession would prove too great a hardship on defendant. Brief for
Appellant, pp. 42-3. This request was not discussed in the opinion. It does not seem as
if the determination as to notice would be determinative as to the request for the
prospective injunction.
7 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 US.C. 1051-127 (1958). Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty,
264 U.S. 359 (1924). The cases of R. B. Semler, Inc. v. Kirk, 27 F. Supp. 630 (ED. Pa.
1938), and Bayer Co. v. Sumner Printing Co., 7 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1934), were
not in point because the defendant did not in any way change or alter the form, contents
or appearance of the comics.
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or copyright laws"; nor was he practicing unfair competition.9
In recent years, the question here presented has also troubled both the
courts and the legislature of New York. In People v. Bunis," section 436-d
of the N.Y. Penal Law, stating:
Any person who knowingly sells, offers or exposes for sale (except in
bulk as waste paper) any newspaper, magazine, periodical or other
publication, except a rare book, manuscript or educational text,
from which the title, trade name, trade mark or other identification
mark has been removed or obliterated, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
was held unconstitutional. The decision was based on the breadth of the
statute,11 and the court explicitly refrained from deciding what result would
have been reached on a statute which confined itself to proscribing illicit
traffic in the cover-removed type of comic which had been returned for
credit.12
While the criminal prosecutions were still in process, an injunction
pendente lite was allowed in the case of Yachting Publishing Corp. v. Fried-
man?' The facts before that court were similar to those in the principal case.
The court stated:
If defendant was aware that contracts between the distributor and
the wholesalers required the latter to dispose of the returned copies
only as waste paper his resales of returned copies purchased from
wholesalers as back numbers of the magazines, and not as waste
paper, were made with knowledge that he was aiding breaches of
the contracts between the distributor and the wholesalers. In any
event, whether defendant purchased from wholesalers or from deal-
ers in waste paper, he purchased personal property, the title to
which had not passed to the wholesalers or to the dealers in waste
8 61 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §¢ 1-215 (1958). Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill &
Co., 61 Fed. 689 (2d Cir. 1894); United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex.
1959).
9 Plaintiff next intends to proceed to a final hearing at which time it will attempt
to establish new facts so that defendant may be enjoined within the scope of the
opinion. Letter from Alexander N. Rubin, Jr., Counsel for the Plaintiff, to the B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev., Nov. 14, 1961. The new facts will in all probability be directed to
showing the inapplicability of UCC 2-403(2).
10 9 N.Y.2d 1, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961).
11 Id. at 3, 210 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
12 Ibid. People v. Bunis reviewed two lower court holdings which had reached
opposite conclusions as to the constitutionality of the statute. The explicit ground for
the holding of the Appellate Division is interesting because, while affirming People •v,
Simmers, 13 Misc. 2d 1097, 181 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1958), it did not affirm its
reasoning. That decision had held the statute unconstitutional as an invalid exercise of
the police power because it was enacted for the purpose of protecting trade in an
economic sense from unauthorized resale rather than for the protection of the health,
morals, safety, and welfare of the public. The decision which was reversed, People v.
Bunis, 24 Misc. 2d 561, 205 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1960), had upheld the statute on
the ground that it was aimed at an evil perpetrated by "unscrupulous sellers of cover-
removed magazines," and furthermore that it, ". . . set forth reasonable regulation . .
in order to prevent a fraud on the public and to facilitate the operation of a reasonable
business practice." Id. at 565, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
13 15 Misc. 2d 810, 182 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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paper because the returned copies had not been so mutilated or
destroyed that they were fit for use only as waste paper."
In view of the evident dissatisfaction of New York with conduct similar
to defendant's,15 the knowledge that several courts had allowed consent
decrees to be entered in cases based on similar facts," the importance to
plaintiff of protecting a merchandizing system that had received the blessing
of a court as long ago as 1936,l7 and the incalculable loss caused Independent
by defendant's conduct,I8 it might have been expected that the Third Cir-
cuit would have been anxious to find a theory whereby it could afford relief.
Plaintiff hoped that, relying on the approach of such cases as International
News Service v. Associated Press,'9 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Sta-
tion,2° and its own 1956 decision of Ettore v. Phi/co Television Broadcasting
Corp.,21 the court would adopt or extend one of several available remedial
theories.22 This, however, was not the case; rather the decision is notably
reflective of the prevailance in our jurisprudence of that policy which favors
the free and unfettered alienability of chattels.23
The key to the decision was the holding that the waste paper dealers who
purchased from the wholesalers did so without notice or knowledge of any
14 Id. at 812, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
15 Supra notes 10-4.
16 Dell Publishing Co. v. Sturman (ND. Ohio 1959); Independent News Co. v.
David Bunis, Supreme Court of New York #2359/59 (1959). Cited in Brief for Appel-
lant, pp. 34-5.
n In Butterick Publishing Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1936), the court said:
Much has been made in argument of a claim that the practice of accepting
the return of covers only for credit or reimbursement has enabled unscrupulous
dealers to sell as reading matter the coverless magazines for which they have
paid nothing.... such a practice is possible and .. . is one which the publishers
have the right to prevent by all fair means. It is no answer to the publishers
that they may prevent the wrong by refusing to accept covers for credit. That
is a reasonable method for them to adopt if they want to in conducting their
business, and they have the tight to prevent the sale of the body of the maga-
zines as reading matter whose covers they have taken, or agreed to take, back
for credit or reimbursement.
Id. at 526-27.




248 U.S. 215 (1918).
327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956).
22 International News Service v. Associated Press, supra note 19, is famed as a
leading case where the doctrine of unfair competition was extended from misrepresenta-
tion to misappropriation. Unfortunately for plaintiff this case is often distinguished and
cited as applicable only on its facts. See opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Cheney Bros.
v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929). Waring and Ettore are instances where
courts accepted arguments based on the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels,
combined with arguments of unfair competition or other types of tortious interference
with plaintiff's rights. For an excellent recent treatment of the development of tort law
in protecting business relations, see Green, Protection of Trade Relations Under Tort
Law, 47 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1961).
23 See opinion of Judge Learned Hand in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1940). "Restrictions upon the uses of chattels once absolutely sold are at
least prima facie invalid; they must be justified for some exceptional reason, normally
they are 'repugnant' to the transfer of title." Id. at 89.
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contractual arrangement between publisher and wholesaler." Thus, when
plaintiff urged that UCC 2-403(1)25 was applicable, and that upon returning
the covers for credit the wholesaler had become its agent with only limited
authority to dispose of the comics as waste" and with no authority to trans-
fer title to them as literary works, the court was able to apply Sec-
tion 2-403(2)27 and find that the defendant had acquired the full comple-
ment of property rights in the comics. The strict holding against plaintiff as
to the knowledge of the purchaser was important because to apply Sec-
tion 2-403(2) the court had to find that the waste paper dealers purchased
<`... in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him was in viola-
tion of ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods.
n28. . .
After properly finding that the federal copyright" and the trade-
24 Supra note 6.
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. VA, § 2-403(1) (1954)
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only
to the extent of the interest purchased. ...
26 Citing Sperry & Hutchinson v. Mechanics Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 833 (1st Cir.
1904) (trading stamp case); Culbertson v. Cook, 308 Pa. 557, 162 Atl. 803 (1932);
Restatement, Agency §§ 175(1), 201(1) (1958); Clark Car Co. v. Clark, 11 F.2d 814
(W.D. Pa. 1925).
27 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 2-403(2) (1954):
Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business.
28 UCC 1-201(9) states:
Buyer in ordinary course of business means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights
or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from
a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. . .
In Yachting Publishing Corp. v. Friedman, supra note 13, the defendant took with
notice; here the court relied upon its somewhat tenuous holding that the record showed
no knowledge by defendant of the contractual arrangement between plaintiff and its
wholesalers. It would seem that in view of the twenty-year history of litigation sur-
rounding this type of contract, the legend contained in the magazine which is clearly
visible once the cover is removed, and the quite general use of such contracts throughout
the magazine industry, that it might be expected that a court would hesitate before
finding good faith and lack of knowledge on the part of a purchaser, and that a proper
record might thus show sufficient "knowledge" to take the transaction out of UCC
2-403(2). If this were so, and if a different record, based on a similar commercial situa-
tion, might show 2-403(2) not applicable, then the doctrine of equitable servitudes on
chattels, discussed infra, would be available. However, it must be considered whether
the conclusion of the court resulted from an overall lack of sympathy with Independent,
from an unsatisfactory record, or whether it is indicative of a developing propensity
of courts to give a broad interpretation to the possible application of UCC 2403(2).
For an interesting discussion of the intended limitations upon UCC 2-403(2), see 1 Report
to the New York Legislature of the Law Revision Commission of 1955, Study of the
UCC, 227-51, 454-60.
28 Supra note 8. Plaintiff urged that under the Copyright Act it had the exclusive
right to "vend" its copyrighted work, and maintained that defendant only bought scrap
paper at a fractional cost of its price as a literary work. Thus it argued, there was no
first sale of the comic as a comic. The court answered this by stating, "Once lawful
ownership of the chattel was transferred to a first purchaser, the copyright holder's
power of control in the sale of the copy ceases." 293 F.2d at 517. 61 Stat. 652 (1947),
17 U.S.C. 27 (1958) states, ". nothing in this act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent,
314
CASE NOTES
mark3° statutes did not afford protection to plaintiff in this instance, the court
quite summarily dispatched the allegation of unfair competition.31 The lead-
ing Waring and International News cases were distinguished, the court finding
a lack of the essential element of misappropriation involved in those cases;
nor was there any misrepresentation or "palming off" as traditionally in-
volved in unfair competition.32 Despite a recent willingness of some courts
to extend the doctrine of unfair competition to new situations as the needs
of justice and business require,33 the court in the instant case was in no
such mood. It suggested that if the plaintiff had properly enforced the con-
tractual provision between itself and the wholesalers, the defendants• would
be unable to purchase the coverless books.34 In discussing the importance
of the legend to the plaintiff's case the court again returned to this theme.
All the facts, said Judge McClaughlin, must rightly call for relief, and in
this case, ". . . the totality of facts does not provide proper foundation for
the issuance of an injunction."33
Although the principal case was significant for the readiness of the
court to apply UCC 2-403(2), it is also important for what it did not do.
By use of the legend and the contractual arrangements the plaintiff was
attempting to enforce an equitable servitude upon a chattel. Yet the court
did not discuss this. Unless this case is to be taken, sub silentio, as a com-
plete public policy declaration against the doctrine of equitable servitudes
on chattels, then upon a record where notice of the distribution contract
is proved against a defendant, the enigmatic question of equitable servitudes
cannot be ignored. Because of conflicting authority" as to the doctrine's
availability and usefulness, such a discussion would be enlightening and
useful. While referring to the various theories often proposed for this pur-
pose, and to their treatment by the judiciary, Judge Biggs in Ettore v. Philco
Television Broadcasting Co.,37 admitted that "the state of the law is still
that of a haystack in a hurricane."" In the areas where some protective
restrictions on personalty are allowed, such as under copyright and trade-
mark statutes, or under the theory of unfair competition, the breadth of
the protection is limited." Why the courts have not filled in gaps left by
these theories to prevent obvious wrongs (what Professor Chafee refers to
as "dirty tricks")," by developing the theory of equitable servitudes on
or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has
been lawfully obtained."
30 Supra note 7.
37 See The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 47 Va. L. Rev. 600 (1961). See also,
Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1940).
32 See Philco Television Broadcasting Corp. v. Ettore, supra note 21, at 490.
33 See Chafee, Unfair Competition, supra note 31, and Green, Protection of Trade
Relations Under Tort Law, supra note 22.
34 Supra note 1, at 517.
35 Id. at 518.
36 Compare Waring, supra note 20, with RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, supra note 23.
37 Supra note 21.
38 Id. at 37.
39 See supra notes 7, 8, 22, 23, 26, 29, 31 and 33. Chafee, Unfair Competition, supra
note 31, states at 1301:
"'Unfair' is a word of art. It leaves out plenty of shabby conduct."
48 Id. at 1289.
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chattels, is partly explained by the judicial antipathy to restraints upon
the free alienation of chattels as unwise public policy,41 and partly by a
traditional hesitancy to experiment. Frequently in equitable servitude situa-
tions the reasoning is obscure, several other theories are often presented to
buttress the contractual argument, and, as a result, the basis of the de-
cisions are uncertain." But notwithstanding the uncertainty of the reason-
ing and the frequent public policy considerations mitigating against their
use, equitable servitudes may be," and have been, enforced."
In an article written in 1928, Professor Chafee suggested that "on gen-
eral principles equitable servitudes on chattels seem a reasonable and flexible
device, which the courts might use when desirable."45 But he suggested
that such use should first be given careful consideration;" and in a later
article he suggested a formula as a guide in such consideration.
The big point is that the imposition of a novel burden, either on
land or a chattel or both, ought not to depend solely on the will of
the parties. The validity or invalidity of the burden they want to
create ought to depend on considerations of public policy. Do busi-
ness needs make it desirable to create this novel burden? Does its
enforcement involve grave possibilities of annoyance, inconvenience,
and useless expenditure of money that it should not be allowed?
In other words, is the game worth the candle?47
Recently, two cases, influenced by the Chafee argument, have enforced
41 The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general
property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally re-
garded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by great freedom
of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand. . . .
Judge Lurton in John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907).
Also see Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels,"
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1261 (1956), and dissent of Judge Hastie in Ettore, supra note 21, at
498.
42 See P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W.D.N.Y. 1922) ; Waring,
supra note 20; Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
795 (1951).
13 On general principles equitable servitudes on chattels seem a reasonable
and flexible device, which the courts might use when desirable.
Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 1007 (1928).
44 Supra note 42. Also In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704 (2d Cir.
1931) (A publishers' trustee in bankruptcy was not allowed to sell copyrights to other
publishers free and clear of royalty agreement with authors) ; Murphy v. Christian Press
Ass'n Pub. Co., 38 App. Div. 426, 56 N.Y. Supp. 597 (1899) ; Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H.
430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955) ; Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App.2d 420, 346 P.2d 505
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959). For leading case contra see Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park, 220
U.S. 373 (1911), affirming 164 Fed. 813 (6th Cir. 1908).
Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, supra note 43, at 1007.
45 Plaintiffs should be put:
. . . on their mettle to prove that their restrictions are not merely the gratifi-
cation of a personal whim, but carry out a commercial purpose as valuable as
that which underlay Tulk v. Moxhay. . . . In this way the controversy is
removed from pure theory.
Id. at 986.
41 Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round : Equitable Servitudes and Chattels,
supra note 41, p. 1258.
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equitable servitudes on personalty. One enforced an equitable servitude
upon a juke box." The second allowed a promissor, who had agreed upon
the purchase of damaged goods that they should not be sold in their original
container, to enforce this agreement against a later purchaser, who took
with knowledge of plaintiff's promise and of a similar promise to plaintiff
by the person from whom the defendant purchased.42 This case, as do most
cases where equitable servitudes are enforced, involved elements of unfair
competition, tortious interference with contractual and business relations,
and, importantly, a consideration of public welfare."
As already mentioned, the practice which Independent sought to pro-
tect by injunctive relief was given judicial approval in 1936.51 Since then, at
least one court has found conduct such as defendant's improperly offensive
to a magazine distributor's carefully developed merchandising system,52
while several defendants have allowed consent decrees to be entered against
them.53 It is submitted that in a situation like the present, where there are
considerations of public policy favoring the enforcement of the restriction
as a proper business practice, as well as considerations favoring the un-
restricted mobility of chattels, much good might come from a thorough re-
examination of the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels. It might
provide a practical and proper remedy; it might be more beneficial to the
public than an indiscriminate application of UCC 2-403(2); or, in Chafee's
terms, the game might be found to be "worth the candle."
JOHN M. CALLAHAN
Trade Regulations—Clayton Act Section 3—Tie-In Sales—Proper Busi-
ness Reason.—Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith CorP.1—A. 0.
Smith is a national manufacturer of storage equipment. It manufactures
a patented glass lined silo and a patented unloading device designed for
use with its silo. From 1951 through 1957 it sold its unloaders separately
on request. During this period it sold eighty unloaders to thirty-six
customers which were used with silos other than those of the defendant's
manufacture. It received complaints from eighteen of these customers and
six unloaders were returned for refund. In 1958, as a result of the volume
of complaints, the defendant adopted a policy of selling its unloaders only
for use in simultaneously purchased or previously acquired silos of its own
48 Pratte v. Balatsos, supra note 44. In a notable comment upon this case, Chafee
failed to give it his wholehearted approval. He was skeptical of the wisdom, on grounds
of public policy, of tying a juke box to a business. Id.
43 Nadal & Co. v. Grasso, supra note 44.
50 See extensive note in 48 Calif. L. Rev. 337 (1960). Also noted in 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 612 (1961). Albrecht, 1 B.C. Ind. and Com. L. Rev. 215, 216 (1960), suggested:
In view of the interest of the public in permitting the unrestricted transfer
of chattels, it would seem better to grant such power (that of enforcing re-
strictive covenants by injunction) only to the manufacturer.
51 Supra note 17.
52 Supra note 12.
53 Supra note 16.
1 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 82 S. Ct. 368 (1961).
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